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It is a close question under the facts of the principal case whether de-
fendant's liability should parallel that of a vendor or that of a newspaper.
The Missouri court decided that, in view of the nature of the services
rendered as an advertising company, defendant's liability should be deter-
mined by the rules of law applicable to a broadcasting company or a news-
paper. Although the advertising company voluntarily transmitted the
printed matter, like a distributor it did not compose, edit, or print what
it transmitted. Like the distributor it could have exercised control over the
publication of the libel only by refusing to transmit the printed matter at
all. Like the distributor it could do so only if it were conscious of the libel.
Why should consciousness be presumed in the case of the advertising com-
pany though not in the case of the distributor? If the advertising company
had mailed a 500-page catalogue instead of a brief circular, would the
analogy between its activities and those of a distributor have been more
persuasive?
On the other hand, so far as it is a question of the nature of the activi-
ties, it seems as justifiable to hold defendant liable for publication in the
principal case as it does to hold a broadcasting company liable for the
transmission of defamatory interpolations made ad libitum." Moreover,
each may insure itself against loss by increasing rates, or by requiring
surety contracts of those who use its facilities.
The trend in most fields of tort law has been away from liability without
fault.' 2 Yet, in the light of recent decisions, it seems that there is a counter-
tendency to increase the application of strict liability in the field of libel
and slander.13 It has been argued that such a development is in line with
good public policy, on the grounds that the protection of the individual from
loss through defamation of character is socially more important than the
protection of corporations from loss accruing from liability for innocent
publications of a libel.24 L. E. M.
TRUSTS-TNTATIVE TRuSTS--JOINT BANx ACCOUNT PAYABLE TO EITuna
OR SuRvivo-[Missouri]-The deceased opened a joint bank account for
herself and the defendant payable to either or survivor. Deceased retained
possession of the pass book, drew the interest during her lifetime, and made
one withdrawal, which she later redeposited. Plaintiff, administrator of
of a libel, or not in any way connected with or responsible for its being
composed and written or printed. Odgers, Libel and Slander (6th ed.
1929) 132-140. When such a person innocently communicates a libel, it is
sometimes said that there was an unconscious publication for which there
is no liability. See: Odgers, Libel and Slander (6th ed. 1929) 132; Becker
v. Brinkop (1935) 230 Mo. App. 871, 78 S. W. (2d) 538; Restatement,
Torts (1938) sec. 581, comment c; Harper, Torts (1938) 505, sec. 237.
11. Cf.: Void, Basis for Liability for Defamation by Radio (1935) 19
Minn. L. Rev. 611; Vold, Defamatory Interpolations (1940) 88 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 249.
12. See Harper, Torts (1938) c. 1; Holmes, The Common Law (1881) 94.
13. See supra note 7.
14. Cf. Vold, Basis for Liability for Defamation by Radio (1935) 19
Minn. L. Rev. 611.
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deceased's estate, suing to recover concealed assets of the estate, claimed
that the bank account was not a joint account in spite of its form because
the deceased had not intended it to be such. Held: Although the presump-
tion in favor of joint ownership in the fund, arising from Section 5400 of
the Revised Statutes of Missouri (1929), was rebutted, the transaction
amounted to a parol trust created by the deceased in favor of defendant.
In re Geel's Estate.1
The court based its decision on an intention, found from the words and
acts of the deceased, to create a parol trust, which it called a trust "in a
manner tentative." The beneficial interest thus created in defendant, the
court said was revocable at the will of deceased during her life, but became
absolute and irrevocable at her death. This is the first time that a Mis-
souri court has recognized the "tentative trust" doctrine. It is true that
the phrase was used in Frank v. Heimann,2 in discussing a bank account
deposited by "A as trustee for B", but the court there held that A's fre-
quent deposits and withdrawals prevented any implication of an intent to
create a trust.
The "tentative trust," which is also known as the "Totten Trust," was
a development of three New York cases. 3 The Missouri court's recognition
of the doctrine in the instant case consists wholly of the phrase," in a
manner tentative," for there is no discussion of the doctrine. However, the
usual form of a "tentative trust" account is "A as trustee for B," while,
in the principal case, the deposit was in the more doubtful form of "A
and B payable to either or survivor." The decision must mean that this
language will be read as "A as trustee for B and B as trustee for A."
A fortiori, "A as trustee for B" would be held a "tentative trust."
The decisions concerning the interest of the survivor in a joint bank
account reveal a good deal of conflict both in result and in theory. Those
courts which have rejected altogether the "tentative trust" doctrine do not,
of course, apply it to joint savings accounts. 4 Some courts uphold joint
1. (Mo. App. 1940) 143 S. W. (2d) 327.
2. (1924) 302 Mo. 334, 258 S. W. 1000.
3. In Martin v. Funk (1878) 75 N. Y. 134, 31 Am. Rep. 446, the court
held that a savings bank deposit established by "A in trust for B" created
a trust in favor of B, although A neither communicated to B her intention
to create a trust nor delivered the pass book to B during A's life. This
case was reversed by Beaver v. Beaver (1889) 117 N. Y. 421, 22 N. E.
940, 6 L. R. A. 403, 15 Am. St. Rep. 531. Fifteen years later, in Matter
of Totten (1904) 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. E. 748, 70 L. R. A. 711, the court
pronounced these deposits to be revocable trusts-the depositor intending
to reserve the power to control the account during life but intending that
there be created upon death an absolute trust in the balance of the deposit.
4. Mathias v. Fowler (1915) 124 Md. 655, 93 Atl. 298; Norway Savings
Bank v. Merriam (1895) 88 Me. 146, 33 Atl. 840; Bath Savings Institution
v. Fogg (1906) 101 Me. 188, 63 Atl. 731; Maine Savings Bank v. Welch
(1921) 121 Me. 49, 115 Atl. 545; Howard v. Dingley (1922) 122 Me. 5, 118
At]. 592; Towle v. Wood (1881) 60 N. H. 434, 49 Am. Rep. 326; Stevenson
v. Earl (1903) 65 N. J. Eq. 721, 55 Atl. 1091; Jefferson Trust Co. v.
Hoboken Trust Co. (1930) 107 N. J. Eq. 310, 152 Atl. 374; McGillivray v.
First Nat'l Bank (1927) 56 N. D. 152, 217 N. W. 150; Darling v. Mattoon
State Bank (1926) 189 Wis. 117, 207 N. W. 254.
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bank deposits as gifts,5 as trusts,6 or as contracts. The Missouri courts
will enforce a parol trusts of a joint interest in a bank deposit as well
as a gift inter vivoso even where the donor has retained possession of the
pass book.10 The problem is complicated in Missouri by statutes which
declare that banks and trust companies shall pay to the survivor of a
joint bank account the funds on deposit at the death of the joint tenant.11
These statutes, however, were passed to protect the banks and trust com-
panies 12 and, as between the survivor and the estate of the deceased joint
tenant, create only a rebuttable presumption that the survivor is to receive
the funds.13
Considering that the form of the deposit in the instant case, "A and B
payable to either or to the survivor," does not indicate an intention to
create a trust, it is possible that the court turned an imperfect gift of a
joint interest into a "tentative trust" in order to achieve a result which
it considered desirable.
E. A. D.
5. Kauffman v. Edwards (1921) 92 N. J. Eq. 554, 113 At]. 598; Marston
v. Industrial Trust Co. (R. I. 1919) 107 Atl. 88. See Ferry v. Bryant
(1935) 19 Tenn. App. 612, 93 S. W. (2d) 344.
6. Bell v. Moloney (1917) 175 Cal. 366, 165 Pac. 917; Williams v.
Savings Bank (1917) 33 Cal. App. 655, 166 Pac. 366; George v. Daly City
Bank (1927) 83 Cal. App. 684, 257 Pac. 171; Murphy v. Haynes (1923)
197 Ky. 444, 247 S. W. 362; McDevit v. Sponseller (1931) 160 Md. 497,
154 Atl. 140; Ladner v. Ladner (1922) 128 Miss. 75, 90 So. 593.
7. Deal's Adm'r v. Merchants' and Mechanics' Savings Bank (1917) 120
Va. 297, 91 S. E. 135, L. R. A. 1917C 548; Chippendale v. North Adams
Savings Bank (1916) 222 Mass. 499, 111 N. E. 371.
8. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Smith (1928) 320 Mo. 989, 9 S. W.
(2d) 58. Harris Banking Co. v. Miller (1905) 190 Mo. 640, 89 S. W. 629,
followed in Northrip v. Burge (1914) 255 Mo. 641, 164 S. W. 584 and in
Rollestone v. National Bank of Commerce (1923) 299 Mo. 57, 252 S. W.
394, framed the test for a valid parol trust in personalty: a declaration
of trust by the settlor, a definite subject matter, and a definite object or
beneficiary. Cf. Citizens National Bank v. McKenna (1913) 168 Mo. App.
254, 153 S. W. 521, and Coon v. Stanley (1936) 230 Mo. App. 524, 94
S. W. (2d) 96.
9. For a gift inter vivos there must be an intention to give, unconditional
lelivery of the property given to the donee, and acceptance by the donee.
In re Soulard's Estate (1897) 141 Mo. 642, 43 S. W. 617. Cf. Eschen v.
Steers (C. C. A. 8, 1926) 10 F. (2d) 739.
10. Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Du Montimer (1916) 193 Mo. App. 290,
183 S. W. 1137 (valid gift of a joint interest in a bank account even where
the donor retained possession of the pass book).
11. R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 5400 (banks), 5464 (trust companies).
12. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Smith (1928) 320 Mo. 989, 9 S. W.
(2d) 58; Schnur v. Dunker (Mo. App. 1931) 38 S. W. (2d) 282.
13. Ball v. Mercantile Trust Co. (1927) 220 Mo. App. 1165, 297 S. W.
415; Bunker v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. (1934) 335 Mo. 305, 73
S. W. (2d) 242; Melinik v. Meier (Mo. App. 1939) 124 S. W. (2d) 594. But
cf. Schnur v. Dunker (Mo. App. 1931) 38 S. W. (2d) 282.
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